Swanton presents a detailed defence of an original and compelling version of virtue ethics. Obviously I cannot discuss all of it here, and will focus on two sections in particular: Swanton's arguments for pluralism over monistic consequentialism, and her discussion of the epistemology of virtue.
The most interesting feature of her theory is indicated by the title -the theory is not eudaimonistic, but irreducibly pluralistic. According to Swanton, a virtue is a disposition to respond appropriately to a plurality of values, where neither the values nor the appropriateness of the response can be reduced or explained in monistic terms. Swanton argues that there is a constraint on virtue ('A correct conception of the virtues must be at least partly shaped by a correct conception of healthy growth and development which in part constitute our flourishing', p. 60), but it is clear to Swanton that virtues do not necessarily contribute to happiness, and so she rejects full eudaimonism.
Swanton's approach is virtue centred in that values in the world are understood in terms of virtues rather than the other way around, and she argues convincingly that this is the right approach. She argues that goods such as victory, knowledge and pleasure should not be seen as intrinsic values that contribute the same value to a whole no matter what the context. Rather than taking the particularist route of using this observation as a reason to give up trying to codify value, Swanton points out that we can understand the value in terms of the virtues. Pleasure, for example, is good when virtuously handled. As she puts it on p. 40, A virtue is a disposition of good responsiveness to items in its field. Though that involves responsiveness appropriate to morally significant features, such as the value of items in a virtue's field, it is not the case that these features are in general set up as good or evil independent of virtue . . . virtuous handling of those items may make those items good.
Swanton recognizes that the 'lush monoculture of consequentialism', as she delightfully refers to it, is a major threat to pluralism. She presents the consequentialist starting point in its most appealing light -in terms of the move from The Simple Thought, 'It can never be right to prefer a worse state of affairs to a better', through The More is Better Thesis, 'We regard as better a state of affairs in which there is more value rather than less value', to The Hegemony of Promotion Thesis, 'The only right-making relation is that of promotion' (pp. 50-1). Swanton's objection to this sequence begins with the claim that we should not see the only point of action as being to initiate change. On Swanton's view, much of what is important and morally admirable about us is passive: admiration, respect, appreciation, and so on. Hence there can be more value in a situation where we have not initiated change than in one where we have. Second, Swanton objects that even if we think of action in terms of initiating change, we should not restrict our conception of the method of initiating change to promotion. Swanton argues that love and creativity are ways of initiating change that may not promote value overall, and yet may be justified.
The consequentialist is not without resources to reply here -to the first objection the obvious response is that an omission is as important as an act. However, I think that Swanton would point out that admiration, respect and appreciation and so on are not really acts in the change-initiating sense, nor omissions. The value in these responses cannot be captured by the consequentialist. This is a palpable hit, I think. It is true that the consequentialist cannot say anything very convincing about the value of particular attitudes that do not have consequences. However, the consequentialist can say convincing things about the value of attitudes in general -of characters in general and so on -for these are bound to have consequences, and at this point the argument becomes an argument about a meta-level: does it matter that the consequentialist can understand the value of these attitudes only instrumentally?
To the second objection the consequentialist ought to reply that Swanton is using too narrow an interpretation of the word 'promotion'. If love and creativity are ways of initiating change, then they are ways of affecting the good, and are relevant to consequentialism. However, Swanton goes on to claim that love and creation can be justified even if they do not promote the good (so long as they do not have a disastrous effect). Here, she is denying not the just the Hegemony of Promotion Thesis, but also The More is Better Thesis. This, I think would be a palpable hit against her view, except that it seems to me that she does not need to say this. She could say, rather, that love and creativity add value to the world in a way that the consequentialist cannot make sense of: they are examples of values that cannot be understood non-aretaically. A world with love and creativity contains more value because it contains more virtue.
In the final section of the book Swanton deals with the question of how virtue ethics is action guiding -in particular, whether we are faced with the daunting task of identifying the phronimos. Aristotle's views have been much criticized on this point, and in a recent review of Rosalind Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics in this journal I argued that Hursthouse does not make enormous progress with the question. Swanton is not comfortable with the 'virtuous agent as oracle' model, and instead proposes a dialogic model. In Swanton's picture, we acquire virtue by solving problems, and we solve problems in discussion with others while exercising the 'virtues of practice'. The virtues of practice fall into three categories -those that concern focusing on the problem, those that concern imagination and understanding, and those that involve standard virtues of communication. Swanton admits that even the best processes may not result in the right answer, and in this I think she is (rightly) in agreement with Aristotle. Though Swanton does not say so herself, I think that her views here could be read as an alternative interpretation of Aristotle, and whatever we think about Aristotle, Swanton's solution to the problem is superior to the phronimos account. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have written an intelligent, carefully argued, and yet also provocative case against fairness as a criterion for legal rules. They 'offer a number of arguments indicating that the conflict between notions of fairness and welfare is much sharper than has been appreciated . . . Under any method of evaluating social policy that accords positive weight to a notion of fairness, there must exist situations in which all individuals will be made worse off ' (p. xviii) . This, they believe, shows that considerations of fairness are counterintuitive, and so their 'central claim is that the welfare-based normative approach should be exclusively employed in evaluating legal rules' (p. 3). The book, then, is an extended case in favour of 'welfare economics' (it seems the term is used on almost every page) over fairness; a sub-argument is that this implies a case against 'philosophers', who seem the chief purveyors of fairness doctrines.
Kaplow and Shavell are especially critical of three aspects of fairness. First, they think the concept is vague (p. 45). Second, it is non-consequentialist. At bottom, they clearly think this is irrational: for whatever reason one thinks fairness is important, one ought to focus on the consequences of a proposed rule in achieving that which is important. If the advocate of fairness thinks that the guilty ought to be punished, then she ought to evaluate a legal rule on its overall consequences -does it reliably punish the guilty? Instead, she is apt to focus on whether, in some specific case, a specific person who is to be punished is actually guilty.
When determining what punishment is just for a convicted criminal, the discussion takes for granted that the criminal has been captured. In this respect, fairness-oriented analysts tend to focus on particular outcomes . . . in important respects, many notions of fairness focus on particular consequences and thereby ignore or undervalue other plausibly relevant aspects of the situation under examination. (pp. 48-9) Kaplow and Shavell are especially worried by the ex post focus of fairness, which looks at what is to be done after the act has been committed (or rule violated), rather than what is to be expected before setting up a system of rules. In contrast, welfare economics is consequentialist: 'social welfare is postulated to be an increasing function of individuals' well-being and to depend on no other factors ' (p. 24) . Welfare economics, we are told, also supposes 'that each individual's well-being affects social welfare in a symmetric manner, which is to say that the idea of social welfare incorporates a basic notion of equal concern for all individuals ' (p. 24) . It is important to stress that for Kaplow and Shavell social norms of fairness may be useful approximations to what is required to promote welfare in everyday life, but they insist that they are not useful guides to welfare maximization in social and legal policy contexts, and have no independent normative standing. Most of these claims are apt to be welcomed by readers of this journal.
Although this is a long book, filled with interesting analyses, it is not especially difficult to get the gist of it, as Kaplow and Shavell typically repeat the same arguments against fairness in different contexts -torts, contracts, legal procedures and law enforcement. In each context we are told how illdefined the criteria of fairness are. The master argument, though, is to show that under some conditions, all individuals can be made better off by accepting an unfair rule. The basic version of the argument is to consider individuals deciding on rules to govern torts, contracts, etc. One rule is then identified as fair -say, that one has a right to bring any valid suit. Kaplow and Shavell typically then make assumptions about possible utility functions (where utility is perfectly correlated with money), and whether individuals are symmetrically placed (i.e. whether each person has an equal chance in ending up, say, as plaintiff or defendant); it is then argued that, once we factor in the costs of care, enforcement, litigation, moral hazard, and other costs, the expected returns from the fair rule are less for everyone than under some unfair, welfaremaximizing, rule. Much of Fairness versus Welfare is devoted to identifying the specific assumptions under which the argument holds (and why these assumptions are plausible), that the main conclusion follows even when some of the assumptions are relaxed (say, symmetry), and to showing how in different legal contexts more subtle variations of this simple case can occur and that even ex post everyone might be worse off under a fair rule.
Kaplow and Shavell recognize -but, I think, never really appreciate its significance -that this has a truistic feel to it (e.g. p. 58). If we define a person's welfare exclusive of fairness, then of course fairness is apt to require sacrifices of welfare. How could it not? Suppose we define welfare for any individual i in a way that does not include fairness, F. Consider rules R W and R F ; assume that R W is identified as the rule that does best under the favoured Social Welfare Function (SWF), and R F is a rule that accords with F. Either the rules are extensionally equivalent, in which case fairness does no work, or they differ in their applications. If they differ then R F calls for an outcome that departs from R W , and so it detracts from the social welfare as identified by the SWF. By definition R F , when catering to F, is not promoting anyone's welfare: fairness must decrease welfare. If we are careful in defining the utilities (the costs and benefits of following various rules) and the amount of knowledge possessed by citizens, we can show that there is a range of cases in which for every person i, i does worse under R F . Given that welfare has been defined independently of fairness, then, it is not surprising that the fair rule sacrifices welfare; it is somewhat more surprising that it worsens everyone's welfare in some cases. In any event, Kaplow and Shavell's analysis does undermine the argument that fair norms are simply the best way to promote welfare by, for example, solving impure co-ordination problems.
Kaplow and Shavell try to make their analysis more persuasive by considering cases in which people have a 'taste for fairness'.
[I]f individuals in fact have tastes for notions of fairness -that is if they feel better off when laws or events that they observe are in accord with what they consider to be fair -then analysis under welfare economics will take such tastes into account. (p. 431, emphasis added; on p. 17 they actually refer to deriving 'pleasure' from fairness) Note the hedonism: They consistently suppose that satisfying a preference for fairness makes people feel better (hence the depiction of such preferences as 'tastes'). This is entirely unjustified given the standard preferential account of welfare. If one prefers fair social state S 1 over unfair S 2 , that's the end of the story: that is one's preference, and so its satisfaction helps define one's well-being. Unless one requires that all preferences ultimately be about one's own-well-being, or adopts hedonism, there is no justification for bringing in good feelings.
Kaplow and Shavell seem to think that, as tastes go, the taste for fairness is a pretty suspicious one: 'there remains the question whether it is always best for society to satisfy this preference' (p. 433). People with tastes for fairness 'may be mistaken, particularly when they favor a rule that in fact reduces social welfare' (p. 433). What, though, can this mean? One cannot simply contrast 'social welfare' to the 'satisfaction of a preference' (for fairness). The latter is a constituent of a person's welfare of which the SWF is supposed to take account. If some people have that preference, then it must be included in whatever SWF is being employed. What Kaplow and Shavell seem to have in mind is that, if we bracket the preference for fairness (which is probably based, they say, on false consequentialist beliefs), and consider instead the set of individual preferences without it, we see that people would be 'better off ' not satisfying it. To say that, though, is like saying that my preference for the last piece of pizza detracts from social welfare, because if I didn't have it, I would be thinner and you would be happier, so we'd all be better off ! But, of course, I would not be better off given my current preferences. This is more important than Kaplow and Shavell realize. If we reject what is known as moral externalism (the doctrine that moral obligations are external to current beliefs and/or motivations), it follows that if people now have moral obligations to act fairly, people must presently have internal reasons to act fairly. Thus it follows that people must have what can be called preferences for fairness right now (this, again, has nothing to do with good feelings). This, though, immediately calls into question Kaplow and Shavell's argument that fair rules can be strongly Pareto-dominated by welfare maximizing rules; people with fairness preferences can be made worse off by adopting unfair rules. The question then becomes what is the preferred SWF. Some advocates of fairness can be interpreted as claiming that SWFs that give special weight to this preference are superior to those that do not; they deny that all preferences, qua preferences, are of equal importance. Just as some have concluded that external preferences (preferences about what others do) should be excluded from an adequate SWF, so one might argue that preferences for fair outcomes should be accorded additional weight. (Kaplow and Shavell [p. 26] may opt for a strong conception of the equality of all preferences, but that is controversial, even within welfarism.) Instead of 'Welfare versus Fairness', we are then confronted with different conceptions of social welfare.
I have focused on Kaplow and Shavell's main criticism -that following fairness leads to loss of welfare. It should be noted, though, that while they are very hard on fairness talk for being unclear and contentious, they are much more tolerant of the uncertainties involved in promoting aggregate welfare. We are told that welfarism is the obvious way to evaluate laws and policies, even though Kaplow and Shavell are uncertain about the preferred function for aggregating individual welfare ('various methods are possible', p. 27), or how welfare and consequences are to be measured. Throughout their book, when they compare the 'uncertain' idea of fairness to 'welfare economics', they simply assume that we can measure welfare (employing dollar amounts for welfare gains). When they finally confront the problem -at the very end of this long book -that we may be uncertain about how to measure welfare and calculate what will best promote it, they fall back on the familiar assertion that, in the face of uncertainties, 'decisions must be based on incomplete empirical data, even conjecture' (p. 458). Although Kaplow and Shavell seem to think normal folk might go wrong calculating on their own (following social norms of fairness is probably a good idea for them), Kaplow and Shavell insist that policy makers must perform such uncertain calculations, and will do an acceptable job. However, theorists and politicians often believe they have a good handle on uncertain social calculations; there is good reason to think they are simply deluded. The work of cognitive psychologists such as Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman indicates that people consistently ascribe high levels of probability to very faulty predictions. Indeed, they report that 'subjects are most confident in predictions that are most likely to be off the mark'. ' [P] eople are prone to experience much confidence in highly fallible judgments, a phenomenon that might be called the illusion of validity ' (1982) . If so, Kaplow and Shavell's conviction that calculative uncertainties are small problems of application, and do not compare with the vagueness of our ideas about justice, seems quite misguided. This book attacks anti-realism and determinism -the alleged enemies of moral responsibility -and sketches a theory of moral responsibility, i.e. desert of praise or blame. Chapter 1 advances moral realism and rejects anti-realist alternatives. Chapters 2-4 attack determinism and downplay the influence of 'luck' on moral responsibility. Chapter 5 discusses desert of punishment. Scattered throughout the book are hints of a theory of moral responsibility.
Robinson defends an objectivist, naturalist, non-reductivist moral realism: Moral properties exist and are natural, but are not 'reducible' to physical properties. Robinson tries to support this metaethical view by citing some allegedly natural but non-physical properties: being a dwelling, being a game, being a cathedral, being a battle, being a gift, etc. (pp. 26-7). These properties are supposed to be 'natural' but not 'reducible' to any configuration of matter: 'although dwellings [e.g.] are utterly natural facts, they are not readily reducible to a congeries of fixed physical attributes' (p. 30). Such properties are not 'subjective' either. Dwellings can be recognized as dwellings only by creatures of a certain sort, but Robinson says 'it would be odd to insist that, because of this, the concept of a dwelling is purely "subjective" ' (p. 30).
Let us grant that, say, being a cathedral is not reducible to a physical property, and that it is not a purely subjective matter which entities are cathedrals. It does not follow that being a cathedral is an objective property. Instead, it is an intersubjective or social property, one that depends on various social conventions, rather than an 'objective' property free from such dependence. So an objectivist moral realist like Robinson should not take comfort in properties like being a cathedral, being a game, being a gift, and so on, even if it could be established that moral properties are like them. On the contrary, an objectivist should be eager to show that moral properties are not like social properties.
But the bulk of Robinson's book is not devoted to an explication or defence of moral realism. Its main target is determinism, both hard and soft, as well as treatments of various species of luck as a destroyer of moral responsibility. In a central passage, Robinson writes: the determinist who implores us to accept determinism on the strength of the arguments favoring it implicitly ascribes to us the power to choose one argument over another, and to do so solely on the basis of the quality of the argument. Thus, to argue for the adoption of such a theory [viz., determinism] is to deny its validity. If this is one of the textbook defects of radical determinism, it is a defect shared by the 'constitutive luck ' thesis. (p. 100) This old chestnut won't work. An argument for determinism need not ascribe to us the power to choose it, any more than an argument for radical scepticism need ascribe to us the power to know whether scepticism is true or false. Even if the determinist, in arguing for determinism, implies that we have the freedom to accept or reject her argument, the most that follows is that we cannot avoid assuming, at some level, that determinism is false. Nothing follows about the truth of determinism itself.
As for moral luck, Robinson divides it into two kinds -nurturance and event luck (p. 119) -and focuses mainly on the former, which is a matter of the social circumstances in which one is born and raised. Robinson denies that these circumstances entirely or largely erase moral responsibility, apparently on the grounds that the law pays very little attention to the conditions in which a defendant was nurtured (pp. 122-7). Robinson deftly details this feature of the law, but I could find no argument from law's failure to take nurturance luck very seriously to the conclusion that the theory of moral responsibility should do the same.
An absence of argument also blemishes Robinson's attempt to assure us, in chapter 4, that our unconscious motives and desires do not rob us of moral responsibility. Robinson says: 'to treat another unfairly is blameworthy and is no less so for the motive being obscure or "unconscious" ' (p. 158). But if the agent's motive really is unconscious, how is the other treated unfairly? Perhaps the other person is harmed, but if, as Robinson says, desert of praise and blame is a matter of one's character (p. 47), not of the consequences of one's action (pp. 115-16), then harm isn't a sufficient ground for moral responsibility. What matters is quality of motive, and it is hard to see how moral responsibility is not drastically mitigated in the case of a motive that is deeply unconscious.
Chapter 5 is devoted to punishment, and Robinson's idea is that punishment is deserved for 'distortion or destruction of moral properties', and thus that punishment properly aims at restoring moral properties to both victim and offender (pp. 188-90). It's hard to know what this means. Robinson uses rape as an example, saying that 'it robs the victim of autonomy' (p. 189). But rape doesn't necessarily rob a victim of her autonomy. Rape violates her autonomy. Thus, there need be no 'destruction' of the moral property of autonomy in the case of rape. As for the rapist, what moral property does he destroy in himself in the act of rape? What if he's morally worthless beforehand, and thus destroys no moral property in himself by raping? Anyway, linking desert of punishment to the 'destruction' of moral properties is unpromising. If, for example, I destroy a man's courage by making him cowardly, do I necessarily deserve punishment? On the other hand, if I slander you and thus treat you more poorly than you deserve, I don't 'destroy' any of your moral properties, but I do seem to deserve punishment.
The literature on desert needs a robust theory of moral responsibility, one that rests on a strong moral realism with good defences against determinism. Unfortunately, in spite of its many virtues -which include remarkable erudition and a useful history of the free will-determinism debate from the Enlightenment to today -Robinson's book does not fulfil this need. Defence of Usury (edited by Nunzia Buccilli and Marco E. L. Guidi, 1996) , and An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (edited by Eugenio Lecaldano, 1998). These translations come after more than a century of oblivion, and are a consequence of the growing attention paid to the utilitarian tradition in contemporary debate.
The series in which the translation of Deontology is published ('Leggere i classici della filosofia' [reading classics of philosophy]) has a peculiar format specifically devised for those approaching the study of the history of philosophy. The text is preceded by a short introduction and followed by two sections respectively entitled 'Context', which provides useful information on Bentham and his works, and 'Co-text', which contains an annotated digest of themes and texts relating to the utilitarian tradition from Helvétius to neo-utilitarianism. Finally, there are a glossary, a reading list, an index and a very interesting 'Reader's guide' divided into three sections: a detailed guide to reading, a thought-provoking guide to the interpretation of the text, and an interesting list of 'outlines of research' on Bentham and utilitarianism. Given the practical and popular character that Deontology had in Bentham's intentions, he would certainly have appreciated this edition that turns his work into a lively and stimulating text, providing at one and the same time a rigorous framework for its historical contextualization.
Reading Deontology is a special experience. The sequence of arguments that compose the first part ('Theoretical Deontology') is plain and convincing, despite some repetitions justified by the unfinished state of the manuscript. Page after page, Bentham unveils the strictures of the ethics of sacrifice and criticizes the pessimistic visions of the human condition, and he guides the reader through a passionate analysis of the nature of good as 'well-being' and of the utilitarian virtues of prudence, probity and beneficence. Deontology recommends the practice of virtuous behaviour as a rational, feasible and even pleasant experience for ordinarily constituted individuals.
In the light of the recent editorial work on Bentham's political and legal writings composed between 1810 and 1832, Deontology appears as a crucial text. The whole construction of the Constitutional Code was grounded on the 'axiom' stating that 'self-regard' constantly prevails over 'other-regard'. The 'securities' that a constitutional code was to plan should accordingly provide a check against the supposed tendency of every individual -including those who are entrusted with a public office -to promote her or his private interest at the expense of the public interest. Nevertheless, Bentham was working at the same time on a text on private ethics that argued that one's personal interest, in the long run, always coincides with one's duty, that it is rational to act benevolently towards others, and that enlightened altruistic behaviour is the gradual and spontaneous outcome of civilization.
From this viewpoint, Deontology could be described as a piece of research on the conditions that make benevolence possible. On the one hand, a sufficient condition is indicated in the positive 'marginal utility' of universal benevolence. Bentham states that the sight of a stranger 'in a state of apparent comfort' is gratifying for an individual, and although the intensity of such a benevolent sentiment diminishes as the number of persons involved increases, any addition in the number generates an increase of benevolence (p. 129 of Goldworth's edition). On the other hand, what comes closer to a necessary condition is contained in the statement that: 'By every act of virtuous beneficence which a man exercises, he contributes to a sort of fund -a sort of Saving Bank -a sort of fund of general Good-will, out of which services of all sorts may be looked for as about to flow on occasion out of other hands into his ' (p. 184) . Notice that 'virtuous beneficence' means here beneficence inspired by benevolence. Clearly, Bentham was not arguing that benevolence coincides in the last resort with enlightened self-interest, but that benevolence is self-expanding because it generates by contagion other sentiments of benevolence, moral praise and reciprocity, which in turn produce a higher level of general happiness.
It seems clear that the 'self-preference axiom' that was at the basis of the Constitutional Code was far from being an 'iron law' concerning human nature. It was a prudential 'as if ' assumption, similar to Hume's statement that in matters of politics all individuals 'without exception' should be considered as 'the greatest knaves and villains that can be imagined'. Contemporarily, Deontology conveyed the message that the expansion of beneficence inspired by benevolence would contribute to creating a happier society spontaneously inspired by the utilitarian philosophy.
In his introduction (pp. 8-9), Cremaschi endorses Goldworth's arguments about the introduction in Deontology of 'a separate, fifth, sanction called the social or sympathetic', which was added to the four sanctions examined in An Introduction (the physical, the political, the moral or popular, and the religious). According to Goldworth (p. xxi note), this addition allowed Bentham to deal with the objection which asserts that there is a contradiction between psychological egoism and the ethical principle of utility. It also provided an answer to the criticism that utilitarianism is compatible with grossly unequal distributions of happiness. However, this does not imply that the introduction of the 'sympathetic sanction' as a source of pleasures was an ad hoc expedient that Bentham excogitated in order to answer the objections to the utilitarian principle. Rather, it was a consequence of more enlarged research on the possibility of benevolence as a motive to action. Peonidis's translation of J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism into Greek is an inestimable contribution to recent philosophical literature in Greece. As continental philosophical influences have been traditionally stronger in the Greek academic community, utilitarianism is not among the popular or well-known philosophical traditions. As a result, J. S. Mill is a relatively neglected philosopher. Peonidis's introduction seems to take full cognizance of this fact, and succeeds in drawing an appealing picture of Mill and his intellectual milieu, which could capture the imagination even of readers not necessarily sympathetic towards utilitarianism. In this respect, his research into Mill's earlier reception in Greece is illuminating. It shows misconceptions embedded in terminological renderings and provides ample reasons for a scholarly definitive edition of Mill's Utilitarianism. Introducing Mill, Peonidis places his ideas in context, but also sheds fresh light on some neglected aspects of Mill's thought in relation to the central concepts of his philosophy and the way in which they all weave together into an intellectually inspiring whole. The book is suitable for the student not acquainted with Mill's ideas thanks to a comprehensive summary of Mill's argumentation, which could serve as a helpful guide through the original text. It also meets the needs of the researcher, who will find an authoritative translation accompanied by extensive and highly informative commentary.
Peonidis, an experienced translator (having already translated Rawls and Dworkin into Greek), has the gift of combining conceptual accuracy with a good sense of language, managing to capture much of Mill's own prose and rendering Utilitarianism in its Greek version an enjoyable read. The extensive and detailed commentary on Mill's original text, reminiscent of Roger Crisp's edition, is based, however, on Peonidis's own original research and is executed with an eye to the needs of the Greek reader. It contains sustained philosophical analysis of some of Mill's well-known statements, which have had a long and controversial history in moral philosophy, as well as relevant valuable information. The edition is complemented by a useful chronology of Mill's life, a bibliography and an index of names.
In the first two sections of the editorial introduction, Peonidis attempts to locate Mill in the history of moral and political philosophy as well as to provide his own interpretation. Drawing on recent philosophical developments associated with the work of Hurka and others on perfectionism, Peonidis argues for an egalitarian perfectionistic interpretation of Mill's philosophy. He objects to the traditional view of Mill as primarily a utilitarian philosopher and proposes a broader perspective, what he calls 'Millian perfectionism' (p. 21), within which his utilitarian ideas are integrated. This is a kind of egalitarian perfectionism which associates the good life, not with unique achievements, but with 'simple everyday things'. This kind of valuable life is accessible to all, as almost all could cultivate their potentialities up to an appropriate level given relatively favourable social conditions (pp. 23, 42) . Peonidis indeed delineates a very appealing and congenial picture of Mill drawing conscientiously on textual evidence. The thrust of his interpretation is that since it is possible to trace ample perfectionist elements in Mill's thought as a whole, notably in publications other than Utilitarianism, we can view utilitarianism and hedonism as ways to 'support, complement and integrate' the perfectionistic dimension of his thought, elaborating in this way a more sophisticated and richer picture of individual perfection (p. 25). This view is related to the theory of moral obligation: Given the perfectionist general framework of Mill's thought as a whole, the areas of human conduct which are exempted from utilitarian obligation allow us to devote ourselves to selfreferential moral ideals and achieve various excellences. Peonidis, however, makes the strong statement that utilitarianism or hedonism 'adapts itself and complements a pre-existent pattern of individual perfection' (p. 29); he also refers to excellences as providing the 'ultimate normative criterion' of human behaviour (pp. 21-2). This amounts to recognizing a moral priority of perfectionism over utilitarianism, which I think is highly controversial. It seems more reasonable to hold that perfectionism may complement utilitarianism, rather than the other way round. It is difficult to see why one should have to be committed to utilitarianism if one's overriding purpose is to realize certain perfectionist values, whether these be egalitarian or not. Now, while opinions on how to interpret Mill will continue to differ the world over, Greek readers will have the benefit of access to a classic of the philosophical canon through an impeccably scholarly edition.
